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Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with
others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two
individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. We
provide analytic results for the limiting cases where linking dynamics is much faster than evolutionary dynamics
and vice-versa, and show how the individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones maps
into the problem of strategy evolution in a well-mixed population under a different game. For intermediate
ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time-scales and show that the
scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n 87.23.Kg 89.75.Fb
Networks pervade all sciences [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. During re-
cent years, researchers have developed methods to character-
ize such networks, providing novel insights into the proper-
ties accruing to those networked systems and organizations.
The classical social network metaphor [6] places individuals
at the nodes of a network, the network links representing in-
teractions or connections between those individuals. Citation
networks, collaboration networks, co-authorship and movie
co-acting networks, as well as the networks of sexual rela-
tions, all fall into this metaphoric representation [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
Most analytical studies on this type of networks carried out
to date have aimed to explain the emergence of the observed
topological properties, as deduced from the empirical data.
Networks, however, are dynamical entities, and in this sense
the empirical information often only provides a fixed-time
snapshot of networks which are continuously evolving. Fur-
thermore, dynamical features of networks have been stud-
ied in connection with their growth, modeled in terms of
the preferential attachment (or cumulative advantage) mech-
anism [1, 6, 7], via random addition and removal of nodes
[2] or by imposing different forms of connectivity saturation
[4, 8, 9, 10]. Moreover, individual decisions to establish or
remove/rewire a given link have been studied by numerical
simulations [4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Here we de-
velop a new model which incorporates decisions of individ-
uals when establishing new links or giving up existing links.
Individuals are capable of making rational choices, modeled
in terms of a game, associated with well defined strategies.
We use evolutionary game theory [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] and
study the dynamical co-evolution of individual strategies and
network structure. We restrict our analysis to symmetric two-
player games, although the model can be easily extended to
games with an arbitrary number of strategies. We obtain an-
alytical results which are formally valid in the extreme limits
when one of the dynamics (strategy or structure) dominates
the other, although our numerical simulations show that the
range of validity of the analytical results is much wider. The
present model leads to single-scale networks as defined in [4],
with associated cumulative degree distributions exhibiting fast
decaying tails [4], as shown in Fig. 1. Such tails which decay
exponentially or faster than exponential, leading to what are
known as “broad-scale” and “single-scale” networks, respec-
tively [4], are features which, together with a large variability
in the average connectivity [1, 2, 5], characterize most real-
world social networks [3, 4]. We start by characterizing the
networks emerging from our model. Subsequently, we intro-
duce individuals who adopt definite strategies and make ratio-
nal decisions by engaging in a game with others, studying how
strategy and structure co-evolve. Finally, we strenghten the
coupling between strategy and structure by letting individuals
evaluate the productivity of links in which they participate.
Let us first consider the structural evolution in a popula-
tion of two types of individuals (players),A and B, occupying
the nodes of a network. The total population size is constant
N = NA + NB . Links define interactions between individ-
uals, being formed at certain rates and having specific life-
times. The maximum possible number of AA, AB and BB
links is respectively given by Nij = Ni(Nj − δij)/(1 + δij)
(i, j = {A,B}). Suppose A and B players have a propensity
to form new links denoted by αA and αB , such that ij links
are formed at rates αiαj . The death rates are given by γij
(with associated lifetimes τij = γ−1ij ). With these definitions
the mean field equations governing what we call the Active
Linking (AL) dynamics of this network are
X˙ij = αiαj(Nij −Xij)− γijXij . (1)
These differential equations lead to an equilibrium distri-
bution of links given by X∗ij = Nijφij , where φij =
αiαj(αiαj + γij)
−1 denotes the fraction of active links. In
Fig. 1 we show how this model leads to stationary regimes of
complex networks which can exhibit different degrees of het-
erogeneity. In particular, the the dependence of the stationary
2networks on the frequency of individuals of a given type will
automatically couple network dynamics with the frequency-
dependent evolutionary dynamics we introduce in the follow-
ing.
Let us now introduce a game between A and B leading
to frequency-dependent evolution of strategies. The game is
given by the payoff-matrix Mij
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
.
In the stationary regime of Active Linking (AL) dynamics,
the average fitness of A and B individuals is given by fi =∑
jMijφij(Nj − δij). It is noteworthy that these expressions
are equivalent to the average payoffs of NA and NB play-
ers who play a game specified by the (rescaled) payoff-matrix
M ′ij = Mijφij on a complete graph.
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FIG. 1: (color online) Cumulative degree distributions for networks
generated with the present model, for populations of size N = 103
and two different types of individuals. The fast decaying tails corre-
late well with the observed tails of real social networks [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
On the other hand, the dependence of the final network on the fre-
quency of each type of individuals leads to a natural coupling be-
tween network dynamics and frequency-dependent strategy evolu-
tion.
So far we have dealt with AL-dynamics. Let us now study
how the frequencies of strategies A and B change under evo-
lutionary game dynamics. We assume that the characteristic
time-scale associated with AL-dynamics is Ta, whereas that
associated with strategy updating is Ts.
Reproduction can be genetic or cultural. We adopt the pair-
wise comparison rule, which provides a convenient frame-
work of game dynamics at all intensities of selection [21].
Two individuals from the population, A and B are ran-
domly chosen for update. The strategy of A will replace
that of B with a probability given by the Fermi function
p = [1 + e−β(fA−fB)]−1. The reverse will happen with prob-
ability 1−p. The quantity β controls the intensity of selection.
For β → ∞ the individual with the lower payoff determinis-
tically adopts the strategy of the other individual. For β ≪ 1,
we recover the weak selection limit of the frequency depen-
dent Moran process [22].
When Ta ≪ Ts, AL proceeds much faster than strategy
update on each node. Hence, the stationary regime of AL-
dynamics determines the average payoff and fitness of indi-
viduals. This means that strategy evolution proceeds as in a
well-mixed population of A and B players (complete graph)
engaged in a game specified by the payoff-matrix M ′ij =
Mijφij . Since AL-dynamics is fast, the dynamics of the sys-
tem does not depend on the starting condition, and we can
compute analytically the fixation probabilities of strategies A
and B. The probability ρA(k) that k A-players introduced
into a population of B-players will take over the entire popu-
lation is given by [21]
ρA(k) =
erf [ξk]− erf [ξ0]
erf [ξN ]− erf [ξ0]
, (2)
where erf(x) is the error function and ξk =
√
β
u
(ku+ v).
We have 2u = a′ − b′ − c′ + d′ and 2v = −a′ +
b′N − c′N + c′. For u = 0, Eq. 2 simplifies to ρA(k) =
(e−2βvk − 1)/(e−2βvN − 1).
On the other hand, in the opposite limit where Ta ≫ Ts,
evolution will proceed according to the usual game dynam-
ics [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]
on a static network reflecting the initial configuration. If we
start from a complete graph then Eq. (2) remains valid, ex-
cept that u and v must be calculated employing the original
payoff-matrix Mij . If we start from another graph topology,
analytical and numerical results for static networks apply in-
stead [37, 38, 39]. Whenever Ta ∼ Ts, one expects a detailed
interplay between these two processes to drive co-evolution.
This regime can be explored by computer simulations of AL-
dynamics. As an example, we investigate the interaction be-
tween cooperators and defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD). A cooperator, C, pays a cost c for every link, and the
partner of this link receives a benefit b > c. Defectors, D, pay
no cost and distribute no benefits. The payoff-matrix becomes
( C D
C b − c −c
D b 0
)
.
On complete graphs, cooperators are never advantageous
compared to defectors. This means if Ta ≫ Ts coopera-
tors are never favored by selection. On the other hand, if
Ta ≪ Ts, the effective payoff-matrix is different, and may
not correspond anymore to a PD, that is, when AL dominates,
the problem becomes equivalent to the evolutionary dynam-
ics of a different game in a complete graph. The advantage
of cooperators from AL can be captured by the parameter
r = (φCC − φCD)/φCC which provides a measure of the
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FIG. 2: (color online) Fast active linking (AL) changes the dynam-
ics of the social network and the payoff matrix. a) AL transforms a
Prisoner’s Dilemma with c = 0.5 and b = 1.0 into a coordination
game. While fixation of cooperators is negligible in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (solid line), cooperators can take over with AL (dashed
line) b) A snowdrift game with c = 0.8 and b = 1.0 in which fix-
ation of defectors is certain is transformed into a harmony game in
which cooperators prevail. The vertical arrows show how AL affects
the fixation probability when initially 50% cooperators are present:
while they have no chances on a complete graph despite their high
abundance, AL makes fixation of cooperation almost certain in both
systems (β = 0.1, N = 100, αC = αD = 0.4, γCC = 0.1,
γCD = 0.8, γDD = 0.32).
advantage of assortative interactions (CC-links) with respect
to disassortative ones (CD-links). In terms of r, the PD is
transformed into a coordination game whenever r > c/b,
which is formally equivalent to Hamilton’s rule of kin se-
lection [40]. In strategy phase space, an unstable interior
fixed point develops at a frequency of cooperators given by
NC/N ≈ (1−r)c/[r(b−c)]. In other words, for Ta ≪ Ts fix-
ation of cooperators is almost certain if the initial fraction of
cooperators in the population exceeds this ratio. In Fig. 2a we
provide numerical examples of this scenario, whereas in Fig. 3
we investigate the behavior of our co-evolutionary model as
Ts/Ta increases. The results of Fig. 3 show how the ratio
of time scales affects co-evolution of strategy and structure.
In all cases we start from well-mixed populations (complete
graphs). Clearly, not only the asymptotic behavior coincides
with the analytic prediction but, perhaps more importantly,
Fig. 3 shows that only for 0.01 ≤ Ts/Ta ≤ 0.1 does the in-
terplay between the two time scales deviate significantly from
the analytic predictions.
Finally, let us further couple the dynamics of links and the
dynamics of strategies by introducing payoff dependent AL-
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FIG. 3: (color online). Co-evolutionary dynamics of strategy and
structure. The curves drawn correspond to the results of computer
simulations carried out for networks of size N = 100. Parame-
ters and payoff matrices are the same as in Fig. 2. The rescaled
payoff-matrix leads to a fixed point at a fraction of cooperators
NC/N ≈ 35%. For each value of the ratio Ts/Ta, we ran 100
simulations, starting from 50% cooperators and a complete graph.
The values plotted correspond to the fraction of runs which ended
with 100% cooperators. We fix Ts = 1 and vary Ta. In each time
step, synchronous updating of strategies is carried out with probabil-
ity Ta/(Ts + Ta) using Fermi-update, AL beeing carried out oth-
erwise. For the extreme limits we obtain perfect agreement with the
analytic predictions. However, the analytic results remain valid for a
much larger range of values 0.01 ≤ Ta/Ts ≤ 0.1 than one would
expect from pure theoretical considerations. Indeed, only between
these two limits a crossover takes place, which depends on the inten-
sity of selection β as illustrated.
dynamics. An interesting coupling arises when we associate
the propensity to form new links and the lifetime of different
types of links with the productivity of those links assessed in
terms of payoffs. Many possibilities can be readily envisaged,
which will lead to different context-based justifications for the
choices of parameters αi and γij . Here we explore the case in
which cooperators and defectors share the same propensity to
form new links αC = αD, whereas the lifetimes of ij-links
are proportional to the average profit expected from that link.
Other linear as well as non-linear alternatives are possible. A
simple average relation, based on the expected outcome from
different types of interactions leads to τij = (Mij +Mji)/2
which yields τCD = τCC/2, whereas τDD = 0. More gen-
erally, we may assume that τCD = τCC/p with p > 1,
maintaining τDD = 0 (this results from the zero-entry in the
payoff-matrix). We may now express r in terms of the con-
stant θ = τCCα2C , obtaining r =
p−1
p+θ , an increasing function
of p. The intuition behind this result is clear: The larger the
value of p, that is, the smaller the lifetime of CD-links com-
pared to CC-links, the smaller the value of b/c above which
cooperation will thrive. Moreover, the larger the value of p
4the smaller the fraction of cooperators that is necessary to be
initially present in the population for cooperation to dominate
over defection in the resulting coordination game.
The transformation between a PD and a coordination game
is not the only possible one: Inspection of φij shows that other
transformations are feasible. The Snowdrift Game (SG) has
recently attracted a lot of attention, due to its potential bio-
logical relevance [30]. In the SG, a cooperator pays a cost c,
but two cooperators share this cost. Whenever one player co-
operates, both receive a benefit b > c, leading to the payoff
matrix
( C D
C b− c2 b− c
D b 0
)
.
For strong selection on complete graphs, the SG leads to a
stable coexistence between cooperators and defectors, cor-
responding to a stable interior fixed point in strategy phase
space at NC/N ≈ (2b − 2c)/(2b− c), which becomes small
whenever c ≈ b. Nonetheless, for large Ts/Ta the SG is
effectively transformed into the Harmony game, for which
1 cooperator is enough to invade the entire population, see
Fig. 2b. For the payoff matrix above, the SG is effectively
converted into a Harmony game whenever r > c/(2b), where
r = (φCC − φCD)/φCC as above. If costs and benefits are
the same, the assortment of interactions r has to be only half
as high as for the transformation of the PD into a coordination
game in order to transform the SG into a Harmony game.
To sum up, by equipping individuals with the capacity to
control the number, nature and duration of their interactions
with others, we introduce an active linking dynamics which
leads to networks exhibiting different degrees of heterogene-
ity. In the limit when active linking dynamics is much faster
than strategy dynamics, we obtain a simple rescaling of the
payoff-matrix. Such rescaling can lead to a transformation
of the type of game, effectively taking place in a finite, well-
mixed population. As the ratio between the time scales asso-
ciated with linking dynamics and strategy dynamics increases,
the interplay between these two dynamical processes leads
to a progressive crossover between the analytic results dis-
cussed here and the evolutionary dynamics of strategies tak-
ing place on static graphs. Complementing previous numeri-
cal explorations [11, 12, 13, 14], the present model provides a
simple analytical pathway towards understanding of how self-
interested individuals may actually end up cooperating, show-
ing how selective choice of new links (favouring assortative
mixing between cooperators) associated with fast rewiring dy-
namics may provide the means to achieve long term coopera-
tion.
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